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FROM A .STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
P'RIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, AND PREMIER
STALIN ISSUED AT MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 1, 1943

*
T HE United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet
Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities,
massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled . . . .
"Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the
interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare
and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time
of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set
up in Germany, these German officers and men and members of
the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be
sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to
the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments
which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible
detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded
parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugo-

*
slavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway,
Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.
"Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish
officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian
hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters
inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet
Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know
they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged
on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those
who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the
three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of
the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that
justice may be done.
"The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies."

*

WHAT .SHALL BE DONE
WITH THE

WAR CRIMINALS?
THE vigorous Moscow Statement by President
Roosevelt, Prime Mini ~te r Churchill, and Premier Stalin on atrocities has been widely discussed and debated. Few people question
the right of the United Nations to bring the war criminals to trial
and to punish them. But many problems will arise when this difficult job is begun.
What is a war crime and who are the war criminals? In what
courts shall the accused be tried? By what laws? What punishmen ts shall be meted out to them?
To each of these and related question there are many possible
answers. And, if we may judge by the experience of the first World
War,· there may not be entire agreement among the people of the
United Nations. The following discussion, therefore, is an attempt
to explore but not prejudge the problems that will come up in trying to deal with the war criminals and in bringing them to the bar
of just.ice.
Let us assume that the armies of the United Nations, having
crushed enemy resistance, have marched into Germany, Japan, and
other Axis countries. They have taken into custody all the enemy
leaders, both political and military, on whom they can lay their
hands. These may include Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Tojo, Mussolini, the general staffs of the German and Japanese armies together
with the naval leaders, and the Gestapo chiefs. The catch will include the local quislings and others who have committed, or ordered
committed, the inhuman crimes we have all rea? about. What shall

be done with them? How shall we do justice and yet not make
martyrs of them?
Many ·people have a ready answer-"Shoot 'em or string 'em
up!" But this kind of action is not consistent with our aims, nor
with those of our Allies. It is true that a victoriou s p ower can
impose upon a defeated power such terms as it wants to, restrained
only by its concern for the judgment of history and its regard for
the principles of international law. Looked at in this way, the
problem of what to do with Axis war criminals is essentially a problem of policy and expediency rather than of legal technicality.
But the United Nations are determined to restore law and order
and a civilized way of life to lands now under Axis tyranny. By
shooting or hanging even the most notorious of war criminals without legal trial, we and our Allies would be charged with sinking to
the barbaric level of our enemies.
In civilized countries even a killer caught with a smoking gun in
his hand is entitled to a fair trial. The laws and customs to which
all civilized states adhere require that a man who commits a crime
be tried in an orderly legal way and given an opportunity to defend
himself.

WHO ARE THE WAR CRIMINALS?
Before we can consider how and where to bring the war criminals
to justice, and what punishments to administer, we must determine
who they are.
We have mentioned some of the groups of men who, most authorities believe, belong to the class of war criminals. Yet, few will say
that all Nazi, Fascist, or Japanese soldiers, sailors, or marines who
may have committed crimes against the military or civilian members of the United Nations are war criminals. Many are themselves
victims of a tyrannical political or military system.
Considering the Axis views and conduct of "total war," war criminals can legitimately be defined, according to some authorities, as
persons, regardless of political or military rank, who during t~e war
in their official capacity have committed acts which violated (a) the
2

laws and customs of legitimate warfare or (b) the principles of
criminal law that are generally observed in civilized legal systems,
or who have ordered, consented to, or conspired in the commission
of such acts.
This definition, we must note, does not include three types of
crime and criminals which many people associate with war-especially with this war:
First, the crime of violating a solemn treaty signed between nations or of starting a war of aggression. No agreement has been
reached among nations, nor rules of law set down, for punishing
treaty violators, either in national or international courts-though
such rules were recommended to the Preliminary Peace Conference
at the close of World War I.
Second, crimes, such as theft, rape, or murder, committed by
soldiers, sailors, or marines on their own initiative and not in connection with military operations. Men accused of these crimes m ay
be tried by national tribunals, either military or civil.
Third, the treason of government officials or party leaders, such
as Pierre Laval of France or Vidkun Quisling of Norway, who
helped deliver up their countries to the enemy. Treason is a crime
with which the courts of each country, not outside tribunals, are
properly suited to deal.
So much for what the definition does not include. It does include,
however, three types of persons who may not be regarded as war
criminals by some authorities :
First among these are officers or officials who, according to the
Moscow Statement, took "a consenting part in," that is, h ad the
power and authority to prevent the atrocities, massacres, and executions, but failed to stop them.
Second, the defirtition includes not only military leaders but
political chieftains. Under Germany's conception of "total war"
there is little difference between the cruelties of the Gestapo (the
civilian undercover police ), the notorious "S.S." (the Nazi Party's
private army to keep the German people in check), and "Death
_ Head" guards at concentration camps, and the cruelties of strictly

3

"On August 21 I said that this Government was constantly receiving information concerning the barbaric crimes
being committed by the enemy against civilian populations
in occupied countries, particularly on the continent of Europe. I said it was the purpose of this Government} as I
knew it to be the purpose of the other United Nations, to
see that when victory i won the perpetrators of these crimes
shall answer for them before courts of law.
"The commi sion of these crimes continues.
"I now declare it to be the intention of this Government
that the successful close of the war shall incll!de provision
for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals.
"With a view to establishing responsibility of the guilty
individuals through the collection and assessment of all
available evidence, this Government is prepared to cooperate with the British and other Governments in establishing a. United Nations Commission for the Investigation of
War Crimes.
"The number of persons eventually found guilty will undoubtedly be extremely small compared to the total enemy
populations. It is not the intention of this Government or
·of the Governments associated with us to resort to mass reprisals. It is our intention that just and sure punishment
shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the
organized murder of thousands of innocent persons and the
commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of
the Christian faith." (President Roosevelt, October 7, 1942.)

4

m ilitary officers. Perhaps the fonner can be more appropriately
tried, however, for violations of ordinary common and statutory
criminal law than for acts contrary to the laws and customs of
legitimate warfare.
Finally, the definition includes businessmen and industrialists of
prestige and power who indirectly participated in or conspired to
commit crimes, especially those wh o shared, often by prearrangement, in. the loot of countries overrun by the Axis armies. This group
might include officials of the 1. G. Farben, Goering, Krupp, Thyssen, and Mannesmann trusts in Germany and the Mitsui and other
Japanese business clans. These officials, as principals, accessories,
or conspirators, might be tried for robberies and thefts actually committed by the military and political leaders ..

THE RULES OF WARFARE AND THEIR VIOLATION
The nations of the world, including our enemies, have at different
times signed treaties governing the conduct of war and outlawing
certain kinds of behavior by the forces of the belligerents. The most
relevant sources of this written law are (1) the Hague Convention
of 1899 relating to the laws and customs of war on land; ·(2) a
revision and extension of this issued in 1907; (3) a convention
regulating the treatment of prisoners of war; and (4) a Red Cross
convention regarding the treatment of wounded and sick members
of armies in the field. The last two were signed in Geneva in 1929.
In addition, certain kinds of behavior are prohibited not only by
these international agreements but by the customary or common law
of warfare as well. T he provisions of the conventions (written law)
and also many of the provisions of the common law of warfare
(unwritten law) are embodied in the military manuals of civilized
states. For the American Army, the relevant law is contained in
FM 27~10, R ules of Land Warfare, which summarizes the violations of the laws and customs of warfare most frequently involved,
as follows:

5

"Offenses by armed forces.- The principal offenses of this class
are: Making use of poisoned and otherwise forbidden arms and
ammunition; killing of the wounded; refusal of quarter; treacherous request for quarter; . . . ill-treatment of prisoners of war; . . ..
firing on undefended localities; . . . misuse of the Red Cross flag
and emblem . . . ; bombardment of hospital3 and other privileged
buildings; improper use of privileged buildings for military purposes; poisoning of wells and streams; pillage and purposeless destruction; ill-treatment of inhabitants in occupied territory." (Paragraph 347, FM 27-10.)
Some of these offenses (for example, refusal of quarter) can only
be military crimes, but ill-treatment of inhabitants in occupied territory, if it results in death, can be prosecuted as "murder in violation
of the laws and customs of warfare."

Offenses against Belligerents
German and Japanese troops have violated many if not most of
the laws and customs of war. Thousands of such instances have
been and are being recorded by the American, Russian, Polish,
Dutch, Norwegian, and other governments. Some of these records
are already in print, and we shall draw a few typical examples from
documents published by the nations concerned. These examples
illustrate the scope of the atrocities which the Axis is charged with
having committed. We may usefully begin with some cases relating
to the violations of the duties of a belligerent toward enemy troops:
Paragraphs 32 and 33 of Rules of Land Warfare affirm that "it
is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having
laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion" and that "it is especially forbidden . . . to
declare that no quarter will be given."
The Polish Ministry of Information, in a compilation of Nazi
atrocities. published in 1942, charges that "After the capitulation of
the fortress of Modlin, heroically defended until the moment of the
surrender of Warsaw, the Germans in one sector of the front mur-
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dered a whole platoon of captured Polish soldiers. They ordered
them to kneel down and raise their arms, then shot them all with
machine-guns. Several Polish officers who had been seized, were
also shot in the same way. Others were transported to Zakroczym,
where they were placed against a wall and shot. On September 2
and 3, 1939, between Rybnik and Wadzim, in Silesia, the Germans
captured a detachment of the 12th Infantry Regiment. They took
no prisoners, but threw the men to the ground, and drove over their
bodies with tanks." (Black Book of Poland~ pp. 116-117.) ,
Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 73, FM 27-10) declare that
"prisoners of war are in the power of the enemy power, but not of
the individuals or bodies of troops who capture them. They must
at all times be treated with humanity and protected, particularly
against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity. Measures of
reprisal against them are prohibited."
According to the representations of Secretary of State Cordell
Hull to the Japanese government, as published in the Bulletin of
the Department of State, February 12, 1944, the Japanese have
savagely. disregarded these rights of American and Filipino soldiers.
"Prisoners of war who were marched from Bataan to San Fernando
in April 1942 were brutally treated by Japanese guards. The guards
clubbed prisoners who tried to get water, and one prisoner was hit
on the head with a club for helping a fellow prisoner who had been
knocked down by a Japanese army truck. A colonel who pointed
to a can of salmon by the side of the road and asked for food for
the prisoners was struck on the side of his head with the can by a
Japanese officer. The colonel's face was cut open. Another colonel
who had found a sympathetic Filipino with a cart was horsewhipped
in the face for trying to give transportation to persons unable to
walk . . • . An American Lieutenant Colonel was killed by a Japanese as he broke ranks to get a drink at a stream . . . Americans
were . . . tortured and shot without trial at Cabanatuan in June
or July 1942 because they endeavored to bring food into the camp.
After being tied to a fence post inside the camp for two days they
were shot."

7

Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 86, FM 27-10) provide that
"Belligerents shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary
to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent
epidemics. Prisoners of war shall have at their disposal, day and
night, installations conforming to sanitary rules and constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness."
Conditions maintained by the Japanese in the prison camps were
a far cry from this humane provision. "At Camp O'Donnell conditions were so bad that 2,200 Americans and more than 20,000
Filipinos are reliably reported to have died in the first few months
of their detention. There is no doubt that a large number of these
deaths could have been prevented had the Ja.panese authorities
provided minimum medical care for the prisoners. The so-called
hospital there was absolutely inadequate to m eet the situation.
Pri oners of war lay sick and naked on the floor, receiving no
attention and too sick to move from their own excrement. The
hospital was so overcrowded that Americans were laid on the
ground outside in the h eat of the blazing sun. The American
doctors in the camp were given no medicine, and even had no
water to wash the human wa te from the bodies of the patients.
Eventually, when quinine was issued, there was only enough properly to take care of ten cases of malaria, while thousands of prisoners were suffering from the disease . . . . It is reported that in
the autumn of 1943 fifty percent of the American prisoners of war
at Davao had a poor chance to live and that the detaining a uthorities had again cut the prisoners' food ration and had withdrawn
all medical attention ."
The code of warfare among civilized nations prohibits the imposition of "punishments other than those provided for the same
acts for soldiers of the national armies . . . upon prisoners of war
by the military authorities and courts of the detaining power."
(Paragraph 119, FM 27-10.)
Yet, to quote Secretary Hull again, ""American personnel have
suffered death and imprisonment for participation in military operations. Death and long-term imprisonment have been imposed
8

for attempts to escape for which the maximum penalty under the
Geneva Convention i thirty days arrest."

Offenses aga inst Civilians
The rules governing the treatment of civilians in time of war are
as tolerant and for~earing as those relating. to belligerents. When
a territory is captured, "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." ( Paragraph 282, FM

27-10.)
This safeguard for the welfare and property of civilians who
happen to find themselves in occupied countries has been consistently ignored by the Axis armies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether in
the entire history of man's cruelty to man there is anything which
surpasses the butcheries of Jews, Poles, Russians, French, Italians,
Greeks, and other peoples caught in the Nazi sweep across the
European Continent. The acts of torture and murder of thousands
of men, women, and children in their homes, streets, and barricaded
ghettos, in death houses specially constructed for the use of live
steam or gas fumes as a lethal weapon, of the forcing of victims to
dig their own graves-these acts have been so numerous as to require many volumes to recount . them.
For example, "In Lublin and the vicinity on the night of March
23 and 24, the Jewish population was simply driven out of their
homes, and the sick and the infirm were killed on the spot. In the
Jewish orphanage 108 children from the age of two to nine were
taken outside the town together with their nurses and murdered.
Altogether that night, 2,500 people were massacred and the remaining 2,600 Jews in Lublin were removed to the concentration camps
at Beliec, and Trawniki . . . . Mass murders occurred on such a
large scale at Rawa Ruska and Bilgoraj that Jewish communities
10

have ceased to exist. . . . In Mielec about 1,300 Jews were slaughtered on March 9; in Mir 2,000 Jews were killed; in Nowogr6dek,
2,500; in Wolozyn, 1,800; in Kajdan6w 4,000 were killed. Thirty
thousand Jews from Hamburg were deported to Minsk where they
were all murdered." (Black Book of Poland~ p. 579.) Since these
acts have not the remotest relation to warfare, they constitute ordinary murders in violation of the penal codes of most civilized states.
Not only have the Nazis shot people in systematic massacres and
boasted of it, as in the razing of the Czech town of Lidice, but they
have terrorized the inhabitants of occupied countries by seizing and
murdering hostages for the slightest infraction of rules-many of
them arbitrary and capricious-which they laid down.
According to Rules ,of Land Warfare (paragraph 343, FM 2710 ) , "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted
upon the population on account of acts of individuals for which
they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible." Yet,
as recorded in the Black Book~ "People were hunted down in the
town, on the pretext that an attempt had been made to fire at
German soldiers from one of the houses . . . . About sixty people
were seized and shot. One of the houses in the Street of The Blessed
Virgin Mary was set on fire by the Germans, after they had thrown
hand grenades into it. There were many persons inside . . . . It was
forbidden to bury or to remove the bodies of those who had been
shot, the object being to terrorize the inhabitants by the sight of
these corpses. They were left unburied until two days later." (Black
Book of Poland, p. 22.)
"As the German authorities had issued an order the previous day
. .. that all arms were to be surrendered before 8 P.M., there was
a general search for arms. In the Institute of the Order of the
School Brothers, an old gun and several Scouts' caps were found
in the theatre wardtobe. On the false pretext that they had been
'concealing arms,' two of the Friars and the father of another were
taken out and shot in the barrack square of the 27th Infantry Regiment. Their bodies were buried in the barrack garden. Many persons were shot simply because toy pistols had been found in their
11

houses, or old sabres which had been forgotten among the lumber
in attics." (Black Book of Poland> pp. 22-23.)
Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 299, FM 27-10) order belligerents to respect "family honor and rights, the lives of persons."
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs charges, in the Polish White
Book, issued in 1942, that "Under pretense of arresting prostitutes,
patrols of German soldiers organized regular raids to carry off young
women. A patrol of the 228th regiment of German infantry organized such a raid in one of the quarters by the river early in 1940.
'soldiers of the 7th anti-aircraft regiment did the same thing twice
in the suburb of Mokotow. Women were taken not only in the
streets but also from their homes. These young unfortunates were
carried off to the barracks of the German soldiers and raped."
(Pp. 229-230.)
.
Other provisions of Rules of Land Warfare order belligerents to
respect the "religious convictions and practice" of peoples in occupied territories, as well as to spare, as far as possible, "buildings
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitaqle purposes, historic
monuments," and "places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided that they are not being used at the time for military purposes." Likewise "The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and
sciences, even when State property" should be treated as private
property, and all seizures of or destruction to such institutions, hi toric monuments, and works of art or science are prohibited. (Paragraphs 58, 299, 318, FM 27-10.)
I:Q a volume of Soviet War Documents, published in 1943, the
Soviet Embassy in Washington states that "Churches in Gzhat k
were turned into stables and warehouses. The Germans set up an
abattoir for cattle in Blagoveshchensky Church. The Predtechenskaya Church and Kazan Cathedral were blown up. The wells in
the town were poisoned and mined. In Sychevka, of 1,000 dwelling
houses 770 were blown up or burned. The museum was burned.
Over 5,000 paintings, including works by Repin, Levitan, Perov,
Aivazovsky, Korovin and others; sculptures by Antokolsky; and
12

gold, silver and bronze articles by masters of the 17th, 18th and
19th Centuries perished in the fire . . . . The following wtHe blown
up or burned: three secondary and two primary schools, vocational
schools .. . a library, a hospital, a restaurant, two children's homes,
the water-pumping tower, the town polyclinic, the telegraph office,
the radio station and other buildings." (Pp. 163-164.)
These are but a few examples of the many atrocities charged
against the war criminals. Illustrations could be drawn from every
occupied country in Europe and Asia. Who is liable for them?
The commissioned officers who issue the orders for pillaging and
sacking cities and murdering civilians? The political chieftains who
set down the policies that are executed by the military commanders?
The rank and file of the Axis armies who pull the triggers of gun
that kill hostages, or carry the torches that set fire to buildings ~ or
plant the dynamite that blows up schools, churches, libraries, museums? Is a soldier liable for crimes he is ordered to commit?
To try to answer these questions we must first go back and see
what happened after the last World War and study the effort made
to define war crimes and to punish war criminals.

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE LAST WAR?
As we have seen, the Moscow Statement (which does not deal
with the Japanese because Russia is not at war with Japan) proclaims that, after the armistice, the German war criminals will be
returned to the scenes of their crimes for trial and punishment by
local courts. In translating this declaration into action after the war,
the United Nations may (;ncounter some complex problems.
Let us, for example, see what was done after the last World War.
What is the history of the action taken against war offenders under
the Treaty of Versailles? On January 25, 1919 the Preliminary
Peace Conference set up a Commission of Fifteen to study the violations of international law chargeable to Gennany and her .allie .
The Commission's majority report declared that a belligerent may
try enemy persons charged with violations of the laws and customs
13

of war, and for this purpose it may set up its own military or civil
courts and use its own trial procedure. Most of the war crimes were
therefore to be tried in the military tribunals or ordinary criminal
courts of the injured nation.
The Commis ion declared, however, that four types of charges
called for trial before an international tribunal: (1) offenses against
civilians and soldiers of the Allied nations, such as outrages in prison
camps; (2) offenses by "persons of authority . . . whose orders
affected the conduct of operations" against the Allied armies;
(:1) offense by civil or military authorities, "without distinction of
rank," who either ordered or "abstained from preventing . . . violations of the laws or customs of war"; and (4) charges against
sundry other perwns, belonging to enemy countries, whom-having
regard for the character of the offense or limitations of the law of
the injured state-it might be advisable to prosecute in an international court.
For these four classes of cases, the Commission recommended that
a "High Tribunal" be set up, the judges appointed by the Allied
governments. This court could determine its own procedures and
apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." Punishments
ould be imposed in accordance with what is customary "in any
country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the convicted per on."

.

The Versailles Treaty
The e recommendations of the Commission of Fifteen were, however, not adopted by the Peace Conference. Objections were raised,
especially by the American and Japanese members of the Commission. The Americans disapproved of the creation of an international
crinJinal court, "for which," they said, "a precedent is lacking, and
which appears to be unknown in the practice of nations." They
also rejected the doctrine that failure to prevent violations of the
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laws and customs of war is a criminal act. The Americans and
Japanese particularly disliked the idea that, if the Commission'
recommendations were carried out, the head of a state, such as the
Kaiser, could be brought before a court set up by his enemies.
And so, instead of following the majority views of the Commission of Fifteen, a milder approach toward war criminals was taken
in the Treaty of Versailles. No provision was made for an international criminal court except that Article 227 provided for a "special tribunal" to try the former Kaiser. This tribunal was to be
composed of five judges, one each to be appointed by the United
States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Since Holland
refused to extradite him, the tribunal was never set up . By Article
228, however, the German government recognized the right of the
Allies "to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." The
German government undertook to hand over the accused to the
Allied governments.
Article 229 provided for the trial of the accused before military
tribunals of the nations where their alleged crimes were committed.
Every defendant was to be permitted to name his own counsel.
By Article 230 the German government undertook to furnish all
the documents and data relevant to the trials.

The Lists of Accused
Accordingly, lists of war criminals were made up by each of the
principal Allied governments, from which a joint sample list of
about 900 names was handed to the Germans on February 3, 1920.
France demanded the surrender of 334 persons, among them the
Crown Prince, Marshal von Hindenburg, Count Bismarck (grandson of the Iron Chancellor), and General Stenger, who was accused
of having ordered his men to massacre all prisoners, including the
wounded.
.
The British claimed 100 Germans, among them Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz and Admiral Scheer, for having ordered submarines
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ruthlessly to sink Allied ships, and some 20 former commandants of
German prison camps, for extreme cruelty.
Belgium caJled for the delivery of 265 Germans, including exChancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, allegedly responsible for the
violation of Belgium's neutrality. Poland, Romania, Italy, and Yugoslavia also demanded the surrender of many high-placed offenders-for murder, arson, theft, pillage, wanton destruction, bombardment of open towns, and similar offenses.
Although, in signing the Treaty of Versailles, the German government obligated itself to deliver up the accused, it soon refused
to do so. In Germany, feeling ran high when the Allied list was
published. Mass meetings of protest were held and everywhere the
surrender of the war criminals was denounced.
On January 25, 1920-even before the list of 900 was presentedGermany had proposed, as a compromise, that all persons charged
by the Allies with war crimes and misdemeanors should be tried before the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig. As evidence of its
determination to punish its own people, the German government
declared that it had brought about the passage of a law on December 13, 1919 providing for the prosecution of war offenders.
After an exchange of many diplomatic notes, the Allies in May
1920 agreed to deliver to the Germans a sample list of 45 war criminals for trial at Leipzig. To this list the British contributed only 7
selected names.

The Leipzig Trials
At last the trial of the war criminals began at Leipzig on May 23,
1921- two and a half years after the Armistice. The duty of trying
their own countrymen fell upon the seven judges of the Criminal
Senate of the German Imperial Court of Justice.
Many of the accused could allegedly not be found by the Germans. For example, the whereabouts of Commander Patzig-whose
V-boat had torpedoed the British hospital ship Llandovery Castle
without warning and had then fired upon and sunk lifeboats containing the survivors--"T"was said to be unknown, although he had an
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address in Danzig. His lieutenant commander could not be traced
at all, while another officer had taken refuge in Poland. In connection with the Llandove.ry Castle atrocity only Lieutenants Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt were put on trial--on the initiative of
the German government.
,
Others who were tried included General Stenger, accused of
ordering the massacre of prisoners, and Captain Emil Miiller,
charged with maintaining such bad conditions at his prison camp
that hundreds of men died.
Altogether 12 men were tried at Leipzig-2 on German charges,
4 on 'British, 5 on French, and 1 on Belgian. Of these 12 men, 6
were convicted. The sentences imposed included: on German
charges, 2 of four years; on British charges, 2 of six months and
1 of ten months; on French charges, 1 of two years. The French
case involved a German major prosecuted for killing wounded
French war prisoners, allegedly on General Stenger's orders. The
General himself was acquitted despite much evidence against him
by German witnesses. Crowds applauded his acquittal and admirers
gave him flowers.
The Allied mission sent to Leipzig withdrew in protest against
the outcome of the 12 cases. The French particularly were angered
and saddened; they and the Belgians, who had suffered most from
German atrocities, indignantly withdrew the documents of accusation and proof. To them, the trials were clearly a miscarriage of
justice. On the other hand, certain prominent Br~tish observers
thought that the German court had done a fairly good job under
great handicaps.
After the Allied observers had left Leipzig, some 800 other cases
of war crimes came to the attention of the German Court, but the
German authorities disposed of all of them by discontinuing the
proceedings, usually on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
In January 1922 a Commission of Allied Jurists, set up to inquire
into the business, unanimously declared that it was useless to let the
Leipzig court continue and recommended that the German government be compelled to hand over the accused persons for trial by
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the Allies under Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty. German
groups, however, organized protest meetings at which high-ranking
German officers reminded the Allies that "250,000 soldiers and the
police of the Reichswehr" were ready to prevent the handing over
of Germans to the "justice of the Entente."
It is significant to note that of the 6 men convicted, the 2 with
the longest terms soon escaped from the house of detention (not a
prison) under suspicious circumstances. Thus ended the fiasco of
bringing the German war criminals to trial.

Lessons' of Leipzig
What are the lessons learned from the Leipzig trials?
First, we cannot trust the enemy to bring his own nationals to
justice.
Second, surrender of the leading malefactors might be made one
of the conditions of the armistice at the end of World War II.
Third, the men accused of war crimes should be tried as soon as
po sible. Otherwise witnesses will almost certainly disappear or
die off and evidence will be lost.
Fourth, most of the preparation for the trials should be handled
by United Nations officials.
Fifth, fair yet not long-drawn-out proceedings should be held.
Sixth, public opinion in enemy countries should be prepared to
recognize the justice of punishing leaders who are guilty of shocking crimes.
Finally, the Leipzig trials and their aftermath show that in the
difficult business of dealing with war criminals the United Nations
must be truly united and of one opinion. Disagreement among the
Allies encouraged the Germans to resist the Allied demands for
the criminals.
The Leipzig trials bring up certain legal questions which we need
to consider here. Under what law, for instance, shall the United
Nations proceed in dealing with war criminals? In what courts
should they be tried? How shall a soldier's defense-that he com18

"I have repeatedly said that unconditional surrender
gives the enemy no rights, but it relieves us from no duty.
Justice will have to be done and retribution will fall upon
the wicked and cruel. Miscreants who set out to subjugate
first Europe and then the world must be punished. So
must their agents who in so many countries have perpetrated horrible crimes. They must be brought to face the
judgment of the populations they have outraged to the
very scenes of their atrocities." (Prime Minister Churchill,
May 25, ]944. )

mitted atrocities only In obedience to his superior's orders- be
treated?
Can chiefs of state, like Hitler, be legally tried and punished?
How shall the accused be got hold of and the guilty punished? What steps shall be taken now to ensure the successful
application of justice at the end of the war?
Let us take up the first question first.

UNDER WHAT LAWS SHALL THE UNITED NATIONS
PROCEED?
Most international lawyers argue that the law of nations is binding only on sovereign states and not on individuals. In other words,
the individual offender can be punished only under the law of his
own or the injured nation. Furthermore, international lawyers are
inclined to argue that when it comes to individuals who violate
the laws and customs of warfare, international law-as, say, in the.
Hague conventions-provides neither courts nor punishments.
Yet, a good case can be made for the view that the common or
customary law of nations does in fact pennit the trial of individuals
and does provide punishment-the d eath penalty. In the case of
piracy this has long been so.
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Violations of the laws and customs of legitimate warfare are the
very kind, some authorities believe, for which individuals ought to
be liable under the law of nations. Not only do soldiers of the Axis
powers enjoy the protection of the laws of warfare when they fall
into the hands of the United Nations, but these nations bring to
trial and punish their own soldiers who violate the laws and customs
of legitimate warfare or the principles of civilized criminal law.
Why, then, should not enemy soldiers be tried and punished for
similar offenses?
The German Supreme Court, during the Leipzig trials, had to
acknowledge the fact that the law of nations was binding upon
individuals. In the trial involving the Llandovery Castle, the court
aid: "The fact that his deed is a violation of international law
must be well-known to the doer. . . . The rule . . . here involved
i simple and is universally known. . . . The court must in this
instance affirm [Commander] Patzig's guilt of killing contrary to
international law."
Since World War I there have been adequate precedents and
authority for a belligerent to punish, under its own laws, enemy
violators of the laws and customs of war. Both German and
American jurists agree that when a state wishes, as a matter of
justice, to punish such an offender, the fact that it has not previously enacted a penal code to suit the crime is irrelevant. Thus,
an American authority on international law, discussing the case of
the saboteurs who were executed in 1942, declared that the decision
which our Supreme Court affirmed "is impressive judicial testi- "
mony to the effect not only that the law of war . . . is a part of
the local law, but also that its applicability by the courts .. . need
not await precise legislative appraisal or definition."
It would indeed be a mockery of justice for an Axis officer to
claim that because no specific code of international criminal law
exists, he did not know that such actions as the slaughter or enlavement of innocent civilians, or the torture of prisoners are
forbidden.
Should we be bound by the theory that only the state and not
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also the soldier is liable for his violations of the laws of war? In
answering this question it should be remembered that the typical
remedies against a state (for example, protest through neutrals, the
taking of measures of reprisal, and the imposition of a "fine" by
way of postwar indemnity) have been shown by experience in both
world wars to be unsatisfactory. for making a lawless state respect
the laws and customs of warfare. Action against individual offenders is far more effective.

TRIAL BY LOCAL COURTS
The vast majority of war criminals will be dealt with as prescribed in the Moscow agreement; that i , they will be returned
to the scenes of their crimes for trial and punishment by local
courts and under local laws. If the legal system of the prosecuting
state so provides, some enemy offenders may be tried in ordinary
criminal courts for violating the domestic penal laws. But most
of them will probably come before military tribunals for violation
of the laws and customs of warfare. The recent trial at Kharkov.
in which three German officers and a Russian traitor were convicted by a Soviet military court and hanged for atrocities, is an
example of how war criminals of this class will be dealt with.
Since there h as been no opportunity for the commission of Nazi
or Fascist war crimes on American territory, there will presumably
be no call that Germans, Italians, or other Axis nationals be "returned to the scene of their crimes" for trial in American courts.
However, under the principle of the Moscow Statement, the United
States will have a hand in the trial and punishment of Japanese
war criminals wJ:lOse offenses took place in Wake, Guam, the
Philippine Islands, the Aleutians, and other Pacific areas.
There will also be charges of war crimes committed against
Americans on European and Asiatic battle fronts. While the
Moscow Statement does not make clear what will be done about
such offenses, the United States will be entitled to have the decid_ing voice in the disposition of the accused. By the same token, once
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having participated in the joint United Nations determination of
who are the war criminals, and having helped in the distribution
of the accused among the various victimized countries, the United
States will have no voice in how those countries apply their own
laws and legal procedures.
As we have seen, many atrocities have already been investigated
and the accused listed by governmental commission and by the
United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes,
which has been sitting in London since the middle of 1943.
The Soviet government has set up numerous commissions to
collect evidence of atrocities in recaptured parts of the USSR. These
have already drawn up detailed accusations. The following is
typical, covering the chief instigators of crimes as well as the soldiers
who allegedly carried them out. "For the crimes committed in the
city of Orel and the Orel Region; for the mass murders of guiltless
peaceful residents; for the murders and tortures of wounded and
sick war prisoners; for the plundering and abducting of Soviet
citizens to German slavery; for the destruction of collective farms,
villages and towns; for th.e looting of the properties of State,
cooperative and public institutions-the Extraordinary State Committee holds responsible the commander of the Second German
Tank Army, General Schmidt; the commander of the Orel administrative area and military commandant of the city, Major General
Hamann, and also the direct executors of these monstrous crimes:
"The chief of the Orel camp for war prisoners, Major Hofmann;
the assistant chief of the Orel war prisoners' camp, Captain Matern,
the garrison doctor Ehrlich, the German doctor Schirmann; the
German doctor at the war prisoners' camp, Kuper; chief of th(::
'labor exchange' Lowe . . . ; chief of the economic kommandatur
Schmidt, chief of the camp of the 'labor exchange' Loch, Sergeant
Majors Winkler, Stricke and Scholz and Corporal Die!. All of '
them must bear severe punishment for the monstrous crimes they
have committed against the Soviet people during the temporary
occupation by the German-fascist troops of the city of Orel and
the 'Orel Region." (Soviet War Documents, pp. 185-186.)
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TRIAL BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
While most war criminals will end . up in the toils of local lawenforcement agencies, certain offenders and offenses call for trial
by an international tribunal. The Moscow agreement evidently
recognized this, for it affirmed that the declaration did not apply
to "German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision
of the Allies." It may reasonably be assumed that the offenders
covered by this provision are those responsible for the wholesale '
atrocities, such as Hitler, Tojo, members of their general staffs,
political leaders, the Gestapo, fascist militia, and others. Their
crimes have been carried out on an international scale and affect
the interests of all civilized peoples in the maintenance of law and
order on an international plane.
United action in these cases could be taken by a joint or mixed
military tribunal, as provided in Article 229 of the Versailles Treaty,
or by a new international criminal court.
To avoid confusion, the joint military tribunal, it has been suggested, might follow the procedure of the prosecuting state, that is,
the state that took the initiative in filing charges against the individual. Its military law, whether English, American, Belgian,
Chinese, Russian, Polish, or other, could be enforced by the joint
court. The choice of the prosecuting state might be by agreement
among the United Nations, depending upon such factors as which
had suffered the greatest injury from the crime, whose law and
procedure is the easiest to apply, and the like. The case might well
be entitled The Unit ed Nations ex reI. The United Kingdom v.
Adolf Hitler,· or The United Nations ex reI. The United States of
America v. Hideki T ojo.
If a true international criminal court is set up, it would embrace
practically all the nations of the world. Thus it would be the agent
of civilized humanity in general and would mainly apply the law of
nations. How would it proceed? An international criminal court
could apply (1) a penal code covering crimes against the family
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of nations, or (2) the common law of nations supplemented by the
Hague and Geneva conventions referred to on page 5 and the
principles underlying and common to most civilized systems of
penal law.
Since the first code does not yet exist, the question arises whether
such a court could lawfully carryon its work. Although some
authorities do not think that it could, it seems, to others, legitimate
to conclude that if the United Nations (and other states who may
wish to join) enter into an agreement to establish an international
court, they could assign to it their recognized individual powers to
try war offenders, and the court would be enforcing law commonly
recognized. This court could, therefore, begin to function without
the prior enactment of an international penal code. But some
guidance would nevertheless have to be given the court-as was
done in the case of the World Court established at the Hague after
the last World War-as to the sources of the law it would apply.
It might derive its law from (1) international conventions, expressly
recognized by the nations involved; (2 ) international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general
principles of law (particularly criminal law) recognized by civilized
nations; and (4) judicial decisions and the teaching of the best
authorities of the various nations.
These sources of law would take account of legitimate defenses
and mitigating circumstances, such as insanity, self-defense, killing
by order of an official or a court, killing in lawful battle, and the like.
Punishment would be meted out according to the seriousness of the
crime, as under civilized law-that is, murder would be punishable
by death or life imprisonment, other crimes by terms of years. There
would be lesser penalties, doubtless, such as fines or loss of civil
rights. Practically all legal systems include elements of fair play
which would guarantee the accused adequate counsel and a chance
to be heard in self-defense.
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that a detailed international
penal code would not have to be enacted by agreement of all the
civilized nations of the world before the international tribunal goes
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to work. Such a code would be, in es ence, only declaratory of
legal principles already in existence.

How Would This Court Be Staffed?
The chief statesmen of the United Nations might nominate the
judges from among those jurists who are acknowledged authorities
on criminal law. The prosecuting staff, as well as public defenders,
might be nominated from panels submitted by the chief executives
of the countries establishing the court. Procedure might consist of
the best features of Anglo-American and, Continental criminal proceedings. Rules of evid.ence could be simple. Appeal to a higher
or appellate branch of the court might be only sparingly provided
for in order to avoid unreasonable manipulation of the processes of
justice. This sketch of the manner in which the war criminals
might be tried by the United Nations leaves some basic legal questions unanswered: Can an accused member of the Axis nations
plead that he was following the orders of a superior when he committed an atrocity? And are chiefs of state liable to prosecution
in foreign courts for their crimes?

ARE "SUPERIOR ORDERS" A LEGITIMATE DEFENSE?
One of the most difficult p:r:oblems to be faced in trying war
criminals is that of determining the guilt of men who claim that
they were acting under orders of their superior-that they did not
commit offenses of their own free will.
.
You will find in paragraph 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare
the following statement: "Individuals of the armed forces will not
be punished for these offenses [violations of the customs and la ws
of war] in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of
their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the
commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into
whose hands they may fall."
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Notice that under this rule the ordinary soldier is excused but
his commander or government is liable. If this rule is continued it
will not be easy to get at the guilty "commander." Is he the lieutenant who qrders a squad of soldiers to machine gun innocent
hostages? Or the captain who issued the order to the lieutenant?
Or the major? Or the colonel? Or the general from whom the
original command came? One can climb higher' and higher until
only the chief of state-Hitler or Tojo-is reached, and he, according to many authorities, cannot be tried at all !
The question is being raised whether the rule as to superior
orders should not be changed. It should be noted that it did not
enter the American Rules until 1914. Before that, the Rules failed
to mention "superior orders," and American courts martial upheld
the principle that a soldier obeying his commander's orders is not
protected if the order is unlawful.
Admittedly, the ordinary soldier is in a tough spot. Ordered to
commit an abominable deed, he mayor may not L l :0W that under
the laws of civilized warfare it is unlawful. Even if he knows that
he is committing an atrocity, it seems hard to hold him responsible,
since all his military training has stressed instant and unquestioning
obedience.
What is the average Nazi or Japanese soldier's choice? He can
ddy a shocking command and be disciplined-perhaps shot on the
spot-or obey it and later be charged by the United Nations with
murder in violation of the customs and laws of war.
This situation is illustrated by a German officer of the last war.
Accused of atrocities in a Belgian village, he replied, "Yes, I know
it was contrary to the law of nations, for I am a doctor of law.
I did not wish to do it, but I did it in obedience to the formal order
of the Governor General of Brussels."
On the other hand, the American Articles of War protect a
soldier or officer who disobeys an obviously unlawful command.
Every Nazi soldier or member of the Gestapo knows, when
commanded to electrocute or gas civilians or pr::,oners of war, that
he is perpetrating a foul deed. If he is strongly indoctrinated with

28

perverted ideas of morality, he may even commit the crime willingly. Should he be protected by claiming obedience to a superior's
order?
To get to the bottom of this dilemma, let us examine American,
British, and German thinking on the subject, as reflected in court
decisions growing out of actual cases.

An EarJy Precedent
One of the most famous precedents on the subject of a superior's
orders is the "Maxwell Case" dating from the Napoleonic Wars.
French prisoners in a Scottish jail had neglected to extinguish a
light in their cell window when ordered to do so by a guard. This
guard, under the direct orders of Ensign Maxwell, fired at the light,
killing one of the prisoners. Maxwell was tried and convicted of
murder by the High Court of Justiciary of Scotland. His plea that
he was acting under orders of higher officers was rejected. The
court declared that "every officer has a discretion to disobey orders
against the known laws of the land."

The American V iew
A famous American case is that of Mitch ell v. Harmony~ a civil
suit growing out of the Mexican War. An American Army officer
in Mexico illegally seized the goods of a trader in occupied territory. When later sued for the price of the goods, he claimed to
have acted under orders of a superior officer. The court refused
to consider this plea. Chief Justice Taney of the United States
Supreme Court declared: "It can never be maintained that a
military officer can justify himself for doing an unlaw ful act by
producing the order of his superior. The order may palliate~ but
it cannot justify" the deed.
In another well-known American case, The United States v. John
Jones, some members of the crew of an American privateer were
tried because, during the War of 1812, they stopped and searched
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a neutral Portuguese vessel on the high seas, a saulted the captam
and crew, and stole valuables. They were held guilty of the act. .
With reference to the defense of Jones and the others that they
had only obeyed their captain's orders, the Justice said: "This
doctrine, . . . alanning and unfounded, is repugnant to reason,
and to the positive law of the land. No military or civil officer
can command an inferior to violate the laws of his country; nor
will such command excuse, much less justify the act. Can it be for
a moment pretended, that the general of an army, or the commander of a ship of war, can order one of his men to commit
murder or felony? Certainly not."
In some later American decisions, however, there is a tendency
to stress the military point of view. The absolute rule which holds
the soldier responsible if the order turns out in fact to have been
unlawful is qualified in these decisions. They tend to grant immunity if the soldier obeyed an order which was not "palpably"
illegal. Whatever may be the practice in military tribunals, it
cannot be said that the true American judicial rule has as yet
been definitely settled.

The Eng lish View
Under English law a soldier has a somewhat more favorable
position than under most American decisions.
A leading case in English legal history is that of Regina v. Smith.
During the Boer War a patrol of British soldiers, sent out on a
dangerous mission, had an argument with a native who hesitated
to find a bridle for them. Smith, one of the soldiers, under orders
of his superiors, killed the native on the spot. After the war, a
special court tried Smith for murder and acquitted him. The
court said, "I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier
believes he. is doing his duty in obeying commands of his superior,
and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that he must or ought
to have known they were unlawful, the private soldier would be
protected by the orders of his superior officer."

30

The German View
In the llandovery Castle case the submarine officers Dithmar and
Boldt claimed that they were carrying out their superior's command
to sink the lifeboats. The German Supreme Court turned a deaf
ea r to their plea and declared, "Military subordinates are under
no obligation to question the order of their superior officers, and
they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence can be
held to exist if such an order is universally known to everybody,
including also the accused, to be without any doubt whatever
against the law. . . . They should, therefore, have refused to obey.
As they did not do so, they must be punished."

A Suggested Ru le
What seems to be needed, according to some students of the
problem, is a rule that will serve as a check upon extreme brutality
and at the same time take account of the soldier's peculiar position
" between the devil and the deep blue sea."
The following rule has been suggested for adoption by an international criminal court as most nearly meeting these requirements
(a suming, of course, that it is supplemented by a sound sentencing
policy): The act of a soldier in obedience to a military order of
his uperior is not justifiable if, when he committed it, he either
actually knew or, under the circumstances, had reasonable ground '
for knowing that the act ordered is illegal either under the laws
and .customs of warfare or under the criminal law of his country;
a n:! when the two systems clash, the former shall prevail.
The final proviso is included because otherwise the most lawless
nations could easily whitewash their soldiers for the most flagrant
violations of the law of nations by simply declaring their acts, if
done against the enemy, to be always lawful under their own law.
Normally, the law to be applied in order to determine the illegality
of the order that resulted in atrocities would have to be the law of
the accused man's country. He could not be expected to know the
_ law of the enemy nation that prosecutes him. However, the laws
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and customs of war, as well as the ordinary principles of criminal
law, are generally known and applicable in Germany, J apan, and
other Axis countries. Incidentally, a non-German court can legitimately ignore" some of the Nazi legislation-such as that which
denies legal status to Jews and other "non-Aryans"-because it is.
so contrary to the elementary principles of justice and fair play.
While a sovereign nation is free to adopt any legislation it sees fit,
the family of civilized nations is not bound to recognize the erratic
Nazi laws.
A rule such as that described above can avoid harsh results if
the sentencing procedure after conviction makes allowances for
the rank of the ~ccused and if his punishment is lessened in certain
circumstances, such as the following: he was not entirely a free
agent; there was no way for him to know definitely that he was.
violating the laws and customs of legitimate warfare; the illegal
order was obeyed under stress, at a period of great danger, during
hostilities, or the like; the command required instant obedience in
carrying out an act that could not be postponed.
If these considerations were applied, many ordinary soldiers
would get off with nominal or slight punishment, while officer
who had more knowledge of the law and greater freedom of action
would be punished more severely. The defense of superior orders
and supptementary leniency should, however, perhaps not apply
to the various private Nazi militias, such as the Elite Guards and
Storm Troopers. Even if it should tum out that they had b en
made part of the German army by law or decree, they clearly do
not deserve the usual protection accorded to soldiers. They originated as private volunteer corps, and at least in a general way
their members knew when they enlisted of the crimes that were
expected of them.

ARE CHIEFS OF STATE LIABLE?
After the last war, one of the major questions in dealing with
war criminals was the responsibility of chiefs of state-particularly
the Kaiser-for' the atrocities committed by their subjects.
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Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty charged the former Emperor
William II "with a supreme offense against international morality
and the sanctity of treaties." The Allies wanted to put the Kaiser
on trial, but he had renounced the throne shortly before the Armistice and fled to Holland. The Dutch refused to give him up.
Will the same thing happen to Hitler or Tojo or their henchmen?
Indeed, what is the status, under the law of nations, of a chief of
state? Is Hitler-the Fuhrer in whose name and upon whose
authority so many of the Nazi crimes have been committed-to be
pursued "to the ends of the earth," as the Moscow Statement says,
and brought to trial?
After the last war, not all authorities agreed that chiefs of state
were punishable as war criminals.
The French accused the Kaiser of being fundamentally responsible for the atrocities committed by the generals and others under
him. "It was necessary," they said, "to go beyond the individual,
the actual author of the act complained of; it was necessary to
search for the chiefs; from chief to chief. . . . In the German
Army there is one supreme chief, the Emperor. Let us know, for
example, whether the act of General Stenger, who was accused
of having issued a proclamation ordering his troops to give no quarter, was ever disavowed. We do not know whether)t was .so or not;
but it is certain that this proclamation reached the ears of the
Kai er and it is he who is responsible." The Kaiser, of course, "did
not give directly all the barbarous orders issued by his generals, but
the latter knew that their acts had his approval; they were only
the executors, high or low, of measures decreed by their master
who felicitated, decorated, or promoted those who distinguished
themselves by their ferocity."
So argued the French. The American merr bers of the Commission of Responsibilities thought differently. They "admitted that
from the moral point of view the head of a state, be he termed
emperor, king or chief executive, is respomible to mankind, but .. .
from the legal point they expressed themselves as unable to see .. .
that the head of a state exercising sovereign rights is responsible to
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any but those who have confided those rights to him by consent,
express or implied." According to this view, the heads of states
are responsible only to their people and should not be made respon. ible to any other nation.
In the light of subsequent events some people challenge this
American opinion and endorse the French view for the following
reasons: The immunity granted a chief of state by other nations
has nothing to do with the immunity he may enjoy inside his own
country. It is based only on international courtesy, and this courtesy
depends on whether the sovereign in question conducted himself
as a law-abiding and trustworthy chief of state. By invading neighboring countries, by violating treaties, and by exterminating masses
of human beings without cause, a sovereign loses, according to those
who hold this view, any immunity he might claim under international law.
Unless the doctrine of immunity is so interpreted, it is argued,
the most brutal and aggressive ruler would always be protected.
If he won the war, he would not only escape punishment but deal
roughly with the losers. If he lost it, he would always be sure to
save his own skin. Since prisoners of war are subject to trial for
violating the laws and customs of war, why should rulers who can
be made prisoners of war get away scot-free? Moreover, would
it be just to punish underlings who were forced to carry out illegal
orders and yet spare the leader who deliberately planned and
ordered wholesale atrocities?
It seems to many people that the Allies made a serious mistake
at the end of the last war by not formally accusing the ex-Kaiser
of the crimes of murder, robbery, kidnaping, and the like. Had
they done so, Holland's legal position for refusing to extradite
vViIliam II on the ground that he was only a political refugee
would have been far less secure.
To set an example of fair and just proceedings the United
Nations must, it seems to many students of the problem, subject
Hitler and other Axis chiefs of state to trial by an international
criminal court.
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What Lord Birkenhead, attorney general of England, said of the
Kaiser might be said of Hitler: "If this man escapes, common
people will say tyerywhere that he has escaped because he is an
Emperor [chief of state]. In my judgment they will be right . . . .
It is not desirable that such things should be said, especially in
these days. It is necessary for all time to teach the lesson that
failure is not the only risk which a man possessing at the moment
in any country despotic powers, and taking the awful decision
between Peace and War, has to fear. . . . If ever again that decision should be . . . at the disposition of an individual, le~ the
ruler who decides upon war know that h e is Rambling, amongst
other hazards, with his own personal safety."

GETTING HOLD OF THE ACCUSED
Determining how, and where, and by what laws to try the war
offenders represents one group of problems. Getting hold of the
accused is another.
In the Armistice that concluded the last World War, the Allies
agreed not to prosecute the war criminal found in occupied Germany until the peace treaty came into force. This proved to be a
mistake which probably will not be repeated. The known malefactors this time will doubtless be seized promptly and put on trial
without delay.
War criminals caught by United Nations forces on non-German
soil will, under the Moscow Statement of November 1, 1943, be
held for international prosecution or turned over for trial to the
authorities of those countries where their atrocities were committed.
In this connection the United Nations should have little difficulty
in exchanging offenders among each other. The tedious technical
process of extradition will not be necessary if a satisfactory agreement is made beforehand.
So also, the offenders taken inside Germany will be turned over.
perhaps, as part of the surrender teI'IIls, to the proper national
tribunals or detained for trial jointly by the United Nations.
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The Right to Give Asylum
One of the most perplexing tasks in rounding up the accused
after the war WIll be to get hold of those major offenders who will
have fled-by plane, submarine, ship, or otherwise-to some neutral
country, where they will do everything possible to resist extradition.
We can be sure that many Japanese and Nazi chieftains have deposited vast sums of money in neutral countries with which they
could hire expensive counsel and attempt to bribe officials, hoping,
like the Kaiser, to live out their days in peace and plenty.
To prevent this very occurrence, President Roosevelt on July 3,
1943 warned all the neutral nations that: "One day Hitler and
his gang and Tojo and his gang will be trying to escape from their
countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country
would give asylum to or extend protection to any of them. I can
only say that . . . the United States Government hopes that no
neutral government will permit its territory to be used as a place
of refuge or otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape
their just deserts."
This warning was supported by Great Britain and a similar note
was sent by the Soviet Union to Turkey and Sweden.
By the summer of 1944 few neutrals remained- those still so
considered were Argentina, Eire, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
Sweden, Turkey, and the Vatican City. The governr -ent of Switzerland took notice of President Roosevelt's warning wii:h the remark
that it would "obviously exercise its rights of asylum in a manner
to assure fully the sovereignty and highest interests of the country."
The Argentine government noted that asylum "can be granted only
for political motives or crimes," and that only the government
granting asylum can determine what is or is not a political offense.

Plugging Up the Loopholes
In view of Switzerland's and ArgentinaJs responses, it is
reasonable to expect some difficulties in getting war criminals

extradited from neutral countries. The Kaiser avoided trial becau e Holland regarded him as a political refugee, not a war
criminal.
The loopholes in existing extradition treaties might, therefore, be
plugged up beforehand, as the London Commission on War Criminals (of the International Assembly, League of Nations Union)
has suggested: "A separate and temporary agreement [should be
made by the United Nations] with the neutral countries, concerning
only war criminals. Without modifying anything in the existing
extradition treaties, those countries should, during a limited period
after the war, be asked to undertake to deliver to the United
Nations all persons accused of such war crimes. The list of those
crimes should of course be drafted, and a new word, such a
'delivery,' should be used in this respect to avoid confusion with
ordinary extradition. In the agreement it should be specified . . .
that the traditional custom of refusing extradition when the crime
was of a political nature does not apply to delivery; that delivery
will take place ven if exemption from punishment has been acquired by lapse of time; that the circum tance that the crime for
which delivery j demanded is punishable by death shall not be a
reason for refusing it; that the circums~ance that the accused alleges to have committed the crime by order of his superior will
not be a rea on for refusing delivery."
It remains to be seen, first, whether ~he neutral countries who
are proud of their ancient rights of asylum-like Switzerland-will
sign such an agreement as the commission proposed, and second,
whether, if the agreements are signed, we can get hold of the wily
war criminals, who will scurry to all ends of the earth and use all
their cunning to avoid falling into the United Nations hands. An
influential Swiss newspaper recently said, while taking the stand
that "granting sanctuary" is Switzerland's own business, "Let u
hope that no one in Switzerland will be in favor of sanctuary being
granted to those having to answer for war crimes." And a Swedish
new paper wrote in 1943 that "If pyromaniacs, murderers, and
thieves succeed in coming to power in a country, they cannot escape
J
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punishment by crossing the frontier into another country when their
time is up."
Meanwhile it is widely recognized that no time should be lost
by all the .United Nations in preparing lists of accused malefactors
and collecting evidence, as the Soviet, Polish, Norwegian, and other
governments are doing. In order to close the avenues of escape,
public opinion in neutral countries could be prepared to accept the
demands that wiJl be placed upon them after the war if the accused
seek sanctuary on their soil. The peoples who have suffered from
the Axis atrocities may not be willing to let the offenders live
serenely and happily on neutral ground and die peacefully of old
age as the ex-Kaiser did in his castle at Doorn.

HOW SHALL THE GUILTY BE PUNISHED?
Many people believe that the United Nations, either individually
or jointly, should dispose of all Axis war criminals by shooting or
hanging. A little reflection, however, shows that this solution of
the problem, though simple, might be contrary to the best interests
of the peoples who have suffered from the Axis cruelties. Apart
from this, the question has been raised whether capital punishment
for most of the guilty is in harmony with scientific criminology and
penology.
In the United States we regard every offender as an individual.
His assets and liabilities are studied and a program is planned to
make the most of his abilities, develop new ones, curb his bad
habits, and gradually restore him to a useful and law-abiding place
in society. Should this policy be followed for the war criminals?
This is a difficult question to answer. For ordinary offenders,
society can afford to experiment with the humane approach, and
the public, even the victims and their families, can be made to
• agree to a policy of rehabilitation. In the case of war offenders
of the Axis type, who have committed thousands of shocking
atrocities, measures of cure and rehabilitation of the individual
offender according to his needs would be interpreted (especially
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by the surviving victims of Axis brutality) as undeserved leniency.
In the end, doubtless, the laws of every country where the war
criminals are tried will determine the type of punishment.
If the chiefs of state and their henchmen are tried by an international criminal court, it should be remembered that, such an
organ of justice does not have its own prison establishment or
psychiatric and reformatory institutions. It would have to create
its- own bureau of punishment and correction; make arrangements
for housing, feeding, and giving work to prisoners; keep track of
their progress; and consider applications for parole.
If the feelings of the occupied countries are taken into account,
however, death would be the punishment for all the leading Nazi
and Japanese offenders. This would of cour e solve the problem
of providing prisons and other places of detention. On the other
hand, it is argued by some that, for political and economic reasons
and to avoid creating "martyrs," it might be wiser to impose sentences of death on certain leaders and then commute them to
prison terms at hard labor for life, perhaps on lonely islands in
distant seas, whence escape would be impossible. The example of
Napoleon banished to the island of St. Helena is mentioned as a
precedent.
In the case of many prominent Axis criminals it is perhaps useless
to attempt correcti'o n and rehabilitation. They could be studied
by psychiatric clinics, however, so that we might learn what made
these men defy the laws of civilization and lead millions of their
fellow countrymen to an orgy of death and destruction. We might
learn a great deal about international gangsterism if we kn w what
made these men tick.
For the younger offenders reeducation and rehabilitation might
be prescribed with a view to helping them to shed the horrible
Nazi and Japanese doctrines and gradually become good citizens.
It is generally agreed that the United Nations should force Germany, J apan, and their satellites to pay the expenses of the trials
and the cost of detaining, correcting, and rehabilitating the war
criminals. Before the war ends the United Nations Commission on
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War Criminals will probably work out policy agreements among
the go~ernments concerned for (1) the classificatipn of offenders;
(2) the use of penal and correctional facilities by the proposrd
international court; (3) employment of prison labor in th~ devastated areas; and (4) other measures that will be necessary for
carrying out the verdicts of courts of law.

TO THE LEADER

The "War Criminals" problem will face us again at the close of
thi war as it did in 1918. The Mo cow Statement quoted at the
beginning of the text lays down general principles. Working out
ways of implementing these principles presents many knotty questions, but they are questions which are sure to be of interest to G. 1.
discussion groups.
Thi pamphlet is so organized as to be an eminently practical
guide to you in conducting one or more discussions on the "War
Criminals" problem. Use this material for forum, panel discussion,
informal discus ion, or debate-whichever method is likely to be
successful with your men. The techniques of all these types of
meetings are outlined in EM 1, G. I. Roundtable: Guide for Discussion Leaders. The forum requires a good speaker who can
address hi audience with authority. An infotmal discussion will be

40

successful with a relatively small group (30 people or less ) under
the guidance of a I ader who can keep the discussion on the track.
Panel discus ion requires about a half dozen individuals who will
prepare themselves to carryon their orderly talk under a chairman
and who can attempt to answer questions from the floor. Debate
is an interesting form because it is a team competition; its disadvantage is that time for questions after the debate is difficult
to arrange.
Whatever form of meeting you select, the table of contents indicates the major i ues to be discussed. Scattered through the text
are many subsidiary question. You can make not s of ' these for
your guidance in conducting the discussion. If the subject is to be
properly covered within the time allotted, you are advised to plan
orne scheme for apportioning the hour between your short introduction and the major points it is necessary to have considered by
the group.
Material in thi pamphlet can easily be used for two meetings.
It is suggested that you divid the major points for discussion as
follow:
First Meeting

1. Who Are the "War Criminals"? (Pp. 2-5 .)
2. What Happened after the Last War? (Pp. 13-19.)
3. Under What Laws Shall the United Nations Proceed?
(Pp. 19-27.)
Second Meeting

4. Are "Superior Orders" a Legitimate Defense? (Pp. 27-32.)
5. Are Chiefs of State Liable? ( Pp. 32-35.)
6. How Can the Accused Be Brought to Trial? (Pp. 35-38.)
7. How Shall the Guilty Be Punished? (Pp.38-40.)
A single meeting can also be planned to cover all seven points
above. In this case you can perhaps include points 1 and 2 in a
brief introductory talk and limit the general discussion to the last
five points.
Chart. You will find a rough chart which lists the major issues
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a valuable aid in keeping the discussion from wandering too far
afield. Be sure to have your lettering sufficiently large to be legible
by all present ..
Other questions for discussion are suggested below. You may
wish to use them instead of or in addition to those suggested in the
text. You may find in them suggestions for further discussion.
1. Should we "forgive and forget," and not subject the enemy
leaders and members of their military and political staffs to punishment? Would you di~tinguish between the Germans and Japanese
in this respect?
2. Should we distinguish between the leaders and the followers?
If so, where shall we draw the line? Shall we limit trial to Hitler,
Mussolini, Tojo, and their henchmen? Shall we also subject to trial
ann. punishment members of the German and Japanese general
staffs who violated the laws and customs of legitimate warfare and
civilized criminal law? Shall we include the leaders of the political
secret police organizations?
3. When it was suggested to a prominent international lawyer
that heads of state are liable to trial and punishment by an international tribunal~ he asked whether Americans and Englishmen
would accept the view that their own chiefs of state could be tried
by foreign courts. What do you say to this question? Would the
trial and execution of Hitler establish a "dangerous precedent" for
the future? If trials are in an international tribunal, should it include some judges from enemy countries? Should it hear charges
against other soldiers?
4. If Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini are executed, how can their
"martyrization" by future generations of Germans, Japanese, and
Italians be prevented?
5. What about the defense of "superior orders"? Compare the
American rule as found in the Rules 0/ Land War/are, the American rule enunciated in judicial decision, the English rule, the German, and the French.
6. Do you think an international criminal court should be established?
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7. If one is established should it confine its trial to the classes
of cases suggested in this pamphlet? If not, how should the court's
jurisdiction be modified?
8. What do you think of the Germans' contention at the close
of W orId War I that trial by a court established by the Allies
would be one-sided and unfair?
9. Do you think we ought to let German and Japanese war
criminals be tried and punished in -their own countries, by their
own courts, and under their own laws?
10. Should Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, and the other leaders be
shot without trial, on the ground that their guilt is notorious and
that trials would only give them a public forum for their antisocial
view s?
11. Should capita l punishment be used in the more serious
cases? Are you in favor of or opposed to capita l punishm ent for
murders committed in your own state ? Are you consistent in your
a ttitude ? I s there a basic distinction betweer the problem of p un ishing wa r criminals and that of punishing ordinary criminals ?
12. Most modern American criminology is opposed to punish ment as an end in itself or as vengeance or retribution. It believes
tha t the chief aim of " punishment" is reeduca tion, reform, and
reh abilita tion of the offender. Do you believe in such a n approach
to the problem ? If so, how can you reconcile it with the p roposal
to punish war criminals as an end in itself or by way of retribution
or vengeance?
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SUGGESTIONS FO R
FURTHER READING

WAR CRIMINALS AND PUNISHMENT. By George Creel.
Published by Robert M. McBride and Company, 116 East 16th
Street, New York 3, N.Y. (1944).
PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS AGAINST THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF WAR. An article by James W. Garner in
American Journal of International Law~ vol. 14, pages 70- 94,
January and April 1920.
TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF THE AXIS WAR CRIMINALS. An article by Sheldon Glueck in Free World~ vol. 4,
pages 138-146, November 1942.
PUNISHING THE WAR CRIMINALS. An article by Sheldon
Glueck in New Republic~ vol. 109, pages 706-709, Nov. 22, 1943.
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS.
By Sheldon Glueck. To be published in the fall of 1944 by Macmillan and Company, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N.Y.
WAR GUILT TRIALS. By Harold Kellock. Vol. 1, no. 11, of
Editorial Research Reports~ 1013 Thirteenth Street, N .W., Washington 5, D.C. (1943).
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN LAWLESSNESS. By Georg Schwarzenberger. Distributed by Thomas
Nelson and Sons, 385 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1943).
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